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Alternative Systems of Cannabis Control in New Zealand A Discussion Paper Drug Policy Forum Trust, Wellington July 1997 Alternative Systems of Cannabis Control in New Zealand Contents
Alternative Systems of Cannabis Control in New Zealand In this discussion paper the Drug Policy Forum summarises the research literature on alternative systems of cannabis control. We analyse the relative advantages and disadvantages of each system, primarily from a New Zealand perspective. However, much of the discussion is relevant to all countries. The Forum does not recommend a particular alternative system in this discussion paper - beyond rejecting total prohibition, which we regard as unworkable and counterproductive. Based on the submissions we receive concerning this discussion paper and on our broader consultative process the Forum will recommend a specific alternative system of cannabis control for New Zealand early in 1998. Submissions should be sent to Drug Policy Forum Trust, PO Box 12199, Wellington, and must be received no later than 15 October 1997. Alternative Systems of Cannabis Control in New Zealand The Drug Policy Forum Trust is a group of scientists and professionals dedicated to elevating the level of debate concerning illicit drug policy in New Zealand. We view drug use as primarily a public health issue. Like dozens of professional bodies before us, the Forum has concluded that placing legal sanctions on the use of popular psychoactive drugs - cannabis in particular - is counterproductive and indeed harmful (although drug-induced misbehaviour causing harm to others should of course remain illegal). Whatever damage is produced by these agents, both to users and to society, is inevitably magnified by prohibition. That this conclusion should remain controversial, even today, represents a serious failure of communication. During the past 25 years at least one governmental, academic, or scientific commission per year, on average, has concluded that a policy of total cannabis prohibition cannot be justified on scientific grounds. Most of these reports are available on the World Wide Web (www.druglibrary.org); several are described in this discussion paper.1 We know of no scholarly body to have endorsed cannabis prohibition as the preferred model of cannabis control. This is the case primarily because cannabis prohibition:
The principal argument advanced for retaining cannabis prohibition is that repealing legal sanctions on (adult) use would lead to increased cannabis use within society, including increases in
These concerns are certainly worth examining; we do so in Appendix A. Based on available evidence, we conclude that any increase in cannabis use following repeal of total prohibition would be (1) small, (2) largely limited to adults, and (3) have little adverse impact on public health. Additional arguments commonly advanced in support of total cannabis prohibition are:
None of these arguments can withstand even a modicum of scientific or logical scrutiny. Indeed, these "arguments" are little more than slogans. See Appendices A-D for a discussion of these issues. We hope that the search for an alternative, evidence-based cannabis control policy is widely supported across New Zealand. Even impassioned anti-cannabis campaigners have acknowledged that it makes little sense to criminalise adults who wish to relax in private with cannabis rather than alcohol. The problem has been, and remains, that whereas prohibition is a simple policy - nobody can use cannabis under any circumstances - any other policy inevitably lends itself to shades of grey and requires that difficult lines be drawn. Thus the challenge, as we see it, is to design a credible, detailed alternative system for cannabis control. To our knowledge, this task has not yet been attempted in New Zealand, nor has the international scientific literature concerning alternative systems been summarised here. It is this latter summarisation task which we attempt in this discussion paper. The former task, designing a detailed alternative system, will be tackled in association with other professional bodies, based on comments received on the discussion paper and on the results of a broad consultation process, including substantial discussions with Maori. Alternative Systems of Cannabis Control in New Zealand The Drug Policy Forum Trust is a group of scientists and professionals dedicated to elevating the level of debate concerning illicit drug policy in New Zealand. In this discussion paper the Forum summarises the research literature concerning alternative systems of cannabis control. The Forum will recommend a specific alternative system of cannabis control for New Zealand early in 1998. Systems of Cannabis Control: Terminology and Classification Several taxonomies of cannabis control systems have been proposed. In this discussion paper we follow the classification developed by the Australian Institute of Criminology:
The terms "legalisation" and "decriminalisation" are avoided because of confusion regarding their meaning. The term "partial prohibition" refers to a system that legalises possession and cultivation of cannabis for personal use, but bans for-profit sale, whereas "regulation" refers to a system roughly equivalent to that used for alcohol. Analysis of Cannabis Control Policies We assume that the principal goals to which a national cannabis policy in New Zealand should be directed are (1) to minimise the harmful use of cannabis and (2) to promote public health. In view of these goals, a key attribute of cannabis control policies is the extent to which policies reduce (or produce) harm to individuals and societies. One major study of alternative policies listed nearly 50 "harms and costs" related to drug use, along with an indication of who bears the harm/cost (e.g. user, society) and the primary source of the harm (e.g., the drug itself, illegality). Harms were divided into four categories: health, social and economic functioning, safety and public order, and criminal justice. The authors concluded that the substantial majority of harms and costs associated with drug use stem from illegality and/or enforcement of the prohibition laws. However, as noted by the authors, judgment is required to assess the relative weight assigned to the various harms and costs - making it difficult to rank policies definitively according to harm produced or prevented. The most extensive analysis of the social effects of alternative cannabis control systems was conducted by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) in 1995. This study evaluated each option in the AIC’s six-part taxonomy (above) along several dimensions, including: patterns of cannabis consumption, health and psychological functioning, law enforcement, crime and other legal issues, education and employment, family and community relations, and the social impact on young people. The authors concluded that, although large gaps existed in the research evidence, a policy of total prohibition generally increases harm across each dimension. These studies imply that a cannabis control policy based on harm reduction requires removal of criminal sanctions on (at least) personal possession, ruling out a policy of total prohibition without an expediency principle (i.e., New Zealand’s current policy). Total Prohibition with an Expediency Principle The Netherlands has since 1976 permitted the sale and purchase of small quantities of cannabis through a system of regulated coffeeshops. These activities remain technically illegal, but are tolerated by the legal-judicial system. According to current information obtained from The Netherlands’ official Ministry of Health internet website, the Dutch policy has
The extent to which a Holland-style coffee-shop model of cannabis control would suit New Zealand is an interesting and open question. The problem of "drug tourism", which has troubled Amsterdam and a few other Dutch cities, would likely be substantially less in New Zealand due to its remoteness and lack of shared borders with other countries. Prohibition with Civil Penalties In this system possession and use of cannabis are not subject to criminal penalties, but are subject to fines. The major advantage of the civil penalty approach is political in that it has already been implemented in several countries. The basic operational advantage of this approach is that low-level offenders would not be burdened with a criminal record. Another potential advantage lies in reducing the cost of enforcing the cannabis law. However, several years’ experience in South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory has shown that such schemes have saved little or no money for the legal-judicial system, and in fact can substantially increase the number of "cannabis crimes". On the other hand, considerable savings has been demonstrated following institution of this policy in California. The major drawback of the civil-penalty approach is that simply substituting civil penalties for criminal ones does nothing to reduce the size (and harmfulness) of the black market. The high profits available in illicit cannabis commerce would continue to draw entrepreneurs into that market. Partial Prohibition Partial prohibition would permit adults to possess up to a defined amount of cannabis and to cultivate up a certain number of cannabis plants. This system was recommended by the Victorian Premier’s Drugs Advisory Committee in 1996 and by the Australian Institute of Criminology in 1995, primarily on the grounds that it would substantially reduce the black market and associated harms. It is in place in Alaska, Spain and Italy. The extent to which partial prohibition would affect the black market and its associated harms is an important question. Experience in Alaska suggests that a substantial black market has persisted despite a policy of partial prohibition (i.e., permitting personal-scale cultivation), but the relevance of this experience to New Zealand is uncertain. The problem of specifying limits on personal-scale cultivation is a difficult one. We discuss this question at some length, concluding that although limits of between five and eight plants under cultivation at one time might seem reasonable. However, there are significant problems related to enforcement and to assuming criminal intent based simply on the number of plants under cultivation. Regulation Only a regulated system is highly likely to severely reduce or eliminate the black market in cannabis. By removing this important source of black market income the power of gangs over young people would in all likelihood be substantially reduced. Additional potential advantages to a regulation approach include:
The differential impact of partial prohibition versus regulation on rural (often Maori) communities is an important, unanswered question. It is important that input be obtained from Maori communities concerning the likely effects of various systems of cannabis control on Maori health and well-being. The major drawback to a regulated system is likely to be political. No other country has adopted a system in which cannabis is regulated and taxed like alcohol or tobacco, although the Netherlands approach comes close. Partial prohibition, on the other hand, has been tried with success in other countries. In addition, there is some concern that a regulated approach might increase the extent to which children are exposed to cannabis. International Treaty Considerations The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 is often considered a barrier to the liberalisation of cannabis policies. However, analysis of treaty commentary suggests that treaty proscriptions concerning cannabis are aimed primarily at large-scale (even international) trafficking. Governmental commissions on cannabis control have arrived at divergent opinions on the question of whether the Single Convention requires signatory nations to ban personal use of cannabis. Most have discerned substantial flexibility in this regard. A 1994 report by the Australian Institute of Criminology took the position that only free availability is ruled out by international treaties, while the Victorian Premier’s Drug Advisory Council took the position that partial prohibition (at least) was permitted under the treaties. Our reading of this complicated literature, and of the treaties themselves, leads us to conclude that a policy of partial prohibition, as defined above, would almost certainly be considered by most authorities as being in compliance with international treaties. On the other hand, a policy of regulated commerce would find less support among a majority of authorities. Of more basic concern is the extent to which international involvements should be permitted to dictate domestic policy. Key Issues in Cannabis Control Outcome Assessment Specification of a plan for ascertaining the important outcomes of a reformed cannabis policy is an essential part of the system. These outcomes include changes in the extent of use within society of cannabis and other drugs, as well as
Education Programmes It is imperative that appropriate and effective education programmes be developed in conjunction with a reformed cannabis control system. As always, specialised programmes would be needed for different target audiences (e.g., adults, school children). The cornerstone of all programmes would be the provision of accurate information. A key goal of drug education programmes would to facilitate the evolution of appropriate public attitudes regarding the responsible use of cannabis. Treatment Programmes Relatively little is known about the effectiveness of treatment programmes aimed at rehabilitating cannabis users with problems of dependence or harmful use. The Forum will depend on advice and submissions from experts in this arena to arrive at additional recommendations concerning cannabis treatment programmes in our final report. Cannabis and Driving In reviewing the evidence on this topic, we find - somewhat surprisingly - that almost every major study performed in this area has shown that drivers who use cannabis only (i.e., no concomitant alcohol) perform at least as well as "straight" drivers. However, the combination of alcohol and cannabis appears to be particularly conducive to the production of fatal accidents. Accordingly, one might consider a policy in which the consumption of any alcoholic beverages be prohibited if one also consumes cannabis prior to driving. Such a policy might be difficult to enforce, however. Alternative Systems of Cannabis Control in New Zealand In this discussion paper we summarise existing scholarly literature concerning alternative systems of cannabis control. The paper is divided into four sections. Section 1 describes the various systems of cannabis control, including certain issues of terminology and classification. Section 2 explores the relative merits and drawbacks of these systems. Section 3 examines the implications of international treaties for efforts to change cannabis laws and policies. Section 4 discusses several key issues that must be resolved during the development of a sensible system of cannabis control in New Zealand. Section 1. Systems of Cannabis Control: Terminology and Classification The problem of cannabis control was first addressed one hundred years ago by the British Indian Hemp Drugs Commission, which issued its seven-volume report in 1893-4. The commission concluded that cannabis prohibition was not practicable, and that the best solution was to tax it to the extent possible. After examining the different regulatory systems in various provinces of India, the Commission recommended the system in Bengal, where cannabis was taxed more rigorously than in other provinces by means of a system of excise fees and vendors’ licenses. (Cannabis possession and consumption remained legal in India until 1989, when these activities were prohibited under terms of the Single Convention Treaty of 1961; see Section 3.) The first detailed analysis of alternative systems of cannabis control was performed by the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse (NCMDA) in the United States in the early 1970s. The NCMDA considered three basic strategies: total prohibition, "partial prohibition," and regulation, the latter approach entailing legal commerce in cannabis, with restrictions analogous to those placed on the sale and use of alcohol or tobacco. In its final report,1 the NCMDA rejected the options of total prohibition and regulation, recommending instead the adoption of a system of "partial prohibition" or "decriminalization," terms used interchangeably by the NCMDA to mean the elimination of penalties (criminal or civil) for private possession of small amounts of cannabis, while continuing to regard any cultivation or for-profit sale as criminal activities. This definition of "decriminalization" was reinforced by the United Nations in 1976, which also introduced the term "depenalization":
During the five years following release of the NCMDA report, eleven States removed criminal penalties for private possession of cannabis, substituting instead civil penalties involving payment of a small fine.3 Sale and cultivation remain felonies, although Alaska permits cultivation of a few plants for personal use.4 Strictly speaking, these policies (except Alaska’s) fit the UN definition of "depenalisation". However, they have almost universally been referred to as "decriminalization", despite not meeting either the NCMDA’s nor the United Nations’ usage of this term. (The Alaskan regime is also typically referred to as "decriminalization", although the tolerance of small-scale cultivation places it within the Australian definition of "partial prohibition", as defined below.) Similarly, the cannabis control regimes in place in South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory, in which civil fines have replaced criminal sanctions for minor cannabis offences (including cultivation), but within which cultivation and sale are still subject to criminal sanctions, are generally referred to as "decriminalisation". The term "depenalisation" appears to have disappeared in the 1970’s. Because "decriminalisation" has come to mean many different things, contemporary drug policy analysts have generally abandoned the term. For example, in their 1996 paper "Assessing alternative drug control regimes," MacCoun and colleagues described eight alternative systems, ranging from "pure prohibition" to "free market":
Similarly, in its 1994 report "Legislative options for cannabis use in Australia,"6 the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) adopted the following classification:
The AIC believed that the use of this terminology:
The taxonomy of cannabis control regimens adopted by the AIC was largely borrowed from the 1978 report of the South Australian Royal Commission into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs (the Sackville Commission)7, although the AIC added the distinction regarding an administrative expediency principle with respect to total prohibition.8 In the present report we also avoid the term "decriminalisation". However, another semantic issue remains to be resolved. Specifically, both the Sackville Commission and AIC use the term "partial prohibition" to mean a system that legalises both personal possession and cultivation of cannabis for adults in small, non-commercial amounts, e.g., up to five plants per household.9 This usage of "partial prohibition" is at odds with the definition adopted by the NCMDA, as described above.10 In its more recent 1995 report The Social Impact of Legislative Options for Cannabis in Australia,11 the AIC continued using both the above taxonomy and the term "partial prohibition" to mean legalisation of (adult) personal-scale cultivation. In its 1996 report, The Victorian Premier’s Drug Advisory Council also adopted the same taxonomy and the same meaning of "partial prohibition."12 Accordingly, in the present report we also adopt the AIC taxonomy (above), including its use of "partial prohibition" to mean the removal of all sanctions from both possession and cultivation of personal amounts, including the non-profit transfer of cannabis among adults. We have elected to exclude from consideration in this report the various medical and personal licensing options included in the taxonomy suggested by MacCoun et al. (Footnote 5). In our view, these options (together with free availability) are probably not viable for implementation in New Zealand in the near future. Section 2. Analysis of Cannabis Control Policies We now consider the various possible systems of cannabis control in light of the principal goals to which a national cannabis policy in New Zealand should reasonably be directed, namely (1) to minimise the harmful use of cannabis and (2) to promote public health. In view of these goals, a key attribute of cannabis control policies is the extent to which policies reduce (or produce) harm to individuals and societies. In this regard, MacCoun et al. listed nearly 50 "harms and costs" related to drug use, along with an indication of who bears the harm/cost (e.g. user, society) and the primary source of the harm (e.g., the drug itself, illegality).1 Harms were divided into four categories: health, social and economic functioning, safety and public order, and criminal justice. Ten health-related harms were identified (e.g., health-care costs, suffering due to physical or mental illness, addiction, disease transmission, inhibition of voluntary pursuit of treatment, restriction on medicinal uses of drugs), of which four were caused wholly or in part by the drug’s illegal status or enforcement, while seven stemmed wholly or in part to use of the drug per se. Of twelve harms related to social and economic functioning (e.g., reduced performance in work or school, poor parenting/child abuse, harm to self-esteem, reputation and employability, accruing criminal networks, infringement on personal liberty), eight were related to illegality and enforcement; seven to use (more than one cause was listed for three harms). Ten harms concerning safety and public order were identified (e.g., accidents at work or on the road, property crime, violence, sense of public disorder, and observably widespread violation of the law) of which eight could be traced to illegality or enforcement, and five to use. Finally, all nineteen harms related to criminal justice (e.g., increased costs for police, courts, and incarceration, policy invasion of personal privacy, corruption and demoralisation of legal authorities, stigma of criminal record) are caused by enforcement and/or illegality alone. The authors concluded that the substantial majority of harms and costs associated with drug use stem from illegality and/or enforcement of the prohibition laws. However, as noted by the authors, judgment is required to assess the relative weight assigned to the various harms and costs - making it difficult to rank policies definitively according to harm produced or prevented. Nevertheless, methods do exist for assigning utilities (or disutilities) to various outcomes, and relative weights could be assigned to the outcomes by samples drawn from the community, from users, or from "experts". It is also possible that the common metric of cost could be assigned to various outcomes. In either case, a judgement could be made about which policy produced the least possible harm. The most extensive analysis of the extent to which alternative cannabis control systems reduce harm was conducted by the Australian Institute of Criminology in 1995.2 The main report was accompanied by a series of seven working papers, the first of which, A comparison of the social impacts of the legislative options for cannabis and their enforcement, evaluated each option in the AIC’s six-part taxonomy (above) along each of the following dimensions:3
The authors concluded that, although large gaps existed in the research evidence, a policy of total prohibition generally increases harm across each dimension. For example, with respect to the dimension most of concern to many observers - social impact on young people - the report concluded that removing criminal penalties from personal use of cannabis would produce the following advantages.4
Systematic analyses of the harms associated with cannabis control, such as the two reports just cited, strongly support the conclusion that the greatest harm associated with cannabis stems from its illegality and from the resulting involvement of cannabis users with criminality and the legal-judicial system. It thus seems axiomatic that a cannabis control policy based on harm reduction would require the removal of criminal sanctions on (at least) personal possession. That is, these studies rule out a policy of total prohibition without an expediency principle (i.e., without an administrative decision not to enforce the law, as in the Netherlands). This, of course, is New Zealand's present policy. The question then becomes which of the remaining five options (outlined on the bottom of page 2) is most appropriate. As noted above, we believe that a policy of free availability (e.g., treating cannabis like caffeine) is insufficiently realistic to warrant discussion here. Total Prohibition with an Expediency Principle As noted in Footnote 8, Section 1, the Netherlands has since 1976 permitted the sale and purchase of small quantities of cannabis through a system of regulated coffeeshops. These activities remain technically illegal, but are covered under a term that means "illegal but permitted" -- that is, police put the lowest priority on enforcing these laws. Supplies of cannabis are obtained from a "grey market" consisting both of cannabis brought over international borders (illegally) and from quasi-legal sources inside Holland. According to current information obtained from The Netherlands’ official Ministry of Health internet website, the results of the Dutch policy have been quite positive:5
Recently, the Netherlands came under pressure from French president Jacques Chirac to re-institute cannabis prohibition. Although no serious consideration was apparently given to complying with this request, the law was changed to reduce the amount of cannabis one can purchase from a coffeeshop at one time from 28 to five grammes. The extent to which a Holland-style coffee-shop model of cannabis control would suit New Zealand is an interesting and open question. From a harm-minimisation standpoint such a system would clearly be an improvement over present total prohibition policies. However, the reliance of the Dutch system on grey-market (or frankly illegally obtained) supplies of cannabis is suboptimal and probably not sustainable in the long term. One substantial advantage of the Dutch system is that is has proved itself successful after more than 20 years of implementation. Moreover, the international community (with a few notable exceptions 18), has generally come to accept the Dutch approach to cannabis control. The problem of "drug tourism", which has troubled Amsterdam and a few other Dutch cities, would likely be substantially less in New Zealand due to its remoteness and lack of shared borders with other countries. Prohibition with Civil Penalties A policy of prohibition with civil penalties is technically not "decriminalisation", as that term is still often used in this context. Thus, someone who denies guilt or does not pay their "instant" fine will still have to be prosecuted through the criminal courts (or some analogous body). A civil-fine policy changes the way in which the law is enforced in many or most cases, but does not change the essential character of the prohibition. Without much doubt the major advantage of a civil-fine approach is political, in that such systems have been in place in Australia, the United States, and Europe for many years. As such, adoption of a civil-fine approach in New Zealand would be relatively non-controversial, and indeed several MPs are on record as supporting a civil-fine approach, including the leader of the Labour Party, Helen Clark.7 It might therefore be argued that a civil-fine approach ought to be implemented initially, if only as a "foot in the door". An alternative system could then be substituted if deemed indicated based on experience with the civil-fine approach. On the other hand, it might also be argued that New Zealand should learn from - rather than repeat - others' experiences with civil-fine systems, which, as will be described below, have not been especially encouraging. Moreover, if a civil-fine system were implemented after much political turmoil it might take several years before politicians would be willing to revisit the issue (perhaps under the rubic of "We've got to give the 'new' system a chance to work"). The major intrinsic (as opposed to political) advantage of civil-fine approaches is that low-level offenders are not burdened with a criminal record. Such an advantage is substantial, of course, although as observed in footnote 4 the extent to which a record of cannabis crimes burdens New Zealanders is unknown, and probably is not as great as in some other countries. Thus, the advantage to be gained from the civil-fine approach in this regard might be relatively small in New Zealand. Another potential advantage of civil-fines approaches lies in reducing the cost of enforcing the cannabis law. However, several years’ experience with such schemes in Australia has shown that they do not necessarily save money for the legal-judicial system, 8 and in fact can increase substantially the number of "cannabis crimes" 9 - a phenomenon known as net-widening." Diversion Schemes Net-widening probably affects most systems incorportating reduced penalties, including "diversion" schemes in general, 10 where offenders who are charged with (usually) relatively minor crimes are offered an alternative resolution to the charge which does not involve trial or the possiblity of conviction. Such schemes are widely employed in Australia, 11 and have been used in New Zealand since 1989. Diversion programs often aim to obtain treatment for drug offenders; 12 in New Zealand, offenders accepting diversion are typically required to apologise and make reparation to their victims (if any), or to make a "contribution" to a public charity. 13 The practice of diversion does not fit neatly into the taxonomy of cannabis control systems considered in this discussion paper. In particular, the terms under which offenders are discharged from the system vary considerably and do not amount simply to paying a civil fine. As such, diversion schemes differ from "classic" civil-fine systems, such as the Cannabis Expiation Notices system used in South Australia and the Simple Cannabis Offence Notice scheme in the Australian Capital Territory. 14 15 In a sense, diversion schemes are based on administrative expediency principles, and as such could be grouped with The Netherland's approach. Specifically, police exercise administrative discretion over who will be offered diversion and who will be prosecuted, and such discretion is motivated in large part by concerns of expediency. However, this same discretion, while potentially useful when skillfully and impartially applied, can also be a source of unfairness if applied on a discriminatory or ad hoc basis. Consider the New Zealand Crown Law Office Prosecution Guidelines, in which it is noted that "It is of great importance that decisions to commence and to continue prosecutions be made on a principled and publicly known basis." 16 However, it is unclear whether any such "principles" have been made publicly known. Indeed, it appears that decisions about whom to offer diversion are made on a case-by-case basis. 17 This situation differs substantially from the administrative expediency principle operating in The Netherlands, where the rules regarding non-prosecution are relatively clear and uniformly applied. For this reason, and because diversion resembles civil-fine approaches in aiming to avoid exposure to the criminal justice system, it seems appropriate to classify diversion schemes with civil-fine systems. Little is known about the outcomes of diversion schemes, including New Zealand's, with respect to the costs and time required of police and magistrates, satisfaction with the process of all involved parties, level of re-offending, and characteristics of offenders offered diversion. In particular, the possibility of differential application of civil-fine and diversion schemes is real and worrisome. As noted in the 1995 AIC report, almost half of those charged with minor cannabis crimes in South Australia failed to pay their fines,
Also, On the basis of police data for 1993 and 1993/94, expiable offences appeared to comprise about 83% of cannabis offences; however, only about 45% of CENs were expiated. . . . It seems probable that poverty - inablity to pay - is one reason for the low expiation rate. 19 Probably the major drawback of both civil-penalty and diversion systems is that simply substituting civil or other penalties for criminal ones does nothing to reduce the size and harmfulness of the black market. The high profits available in illicit cannabis commerce would continue to draw entrepreneurs into that market. This is significant because many of the harms to young people associated with cannabis use stem directly from the presence of a black market. It was primarily for this reason that the Victorian Premier’s Drugs Advisory Council (DAC) rejected civil-fine approaches to cannabis control, recommending insyead a system of partial prohibition. 20 As discussed above, a policy of partial prohibition would permit adults to possess up to a certain amount of cannabis and to cultivate up to some number of cannabis plants. Non-profit distribution amongst friends would be permitted, but sale for profit would remain banned. The DAC appeared to consider partial prohibition as essentially equivalent to "partial regulation":
Like the DAC, the AIC appeared to favour a policy of partial prohibition in its 1995 report:
The extent to which partial prohibition would affect the black market and its associated harms is an important question. Limited data are available concerning the proportion of cannabis users who would elect to "grow their own" or who would procure their supply in the form of non-profit transactions among friends, if such were legal. Experience in Alaska suggests that a substantial black market has persisted despite a policy of partial prohibition. 24 The extent to which this experience is relevant to New Zealand is uncertain. Growing conditions are substantially superior in New Zealand compared to Alaska, and a greater degree of networking might be available for sharing "home-grown" cannabis than in sparsely populated Alaska. A related concern with respect to the effect of policy changes on the cannabis black market must be raised at this point. The "shadow of illegality" hanging over many rural communities, including (and especially) Maori communities, almost certainly detracts from the well-being of those communities and of the individuals who live in them. Ironically, however, any decrease in the black market produced by home-growing throughout New Zealand might reduce income to communities currently dependent on black-market cannabis commerce. The potential impact on rural income of a regulated approach to cannabis control is discussed in the next section. One theoretical disadvantage to permitting home cultivation while banning regulated sales could be that some users would be encouraged to consume more cannabis than under a regulated system. This could occur if people who want to try cannabis were to invest considerable time and effort into cultivating a crop, thereby making a larger commitment to that crop and ending up with a much larger supply than they'd have purchased -- possibly for years to come. Admittedly this concern is quite speculative, and it is likely that the AIC is correct in saying (quoted previous page) that many or most users would continue obtaining their supply through the black market. Limits on Personal Cultivation Recent governmental reports recommending policies of partial prohibition, including the Victorian Premier’s Drug Advisory Council 25 have advocated limits of five cannabis plants under cultivation and possession of 25 grammes of finished product at a given time. At the time of this writing (July 1997), the Australian federal government is developing an Australian Model Criminal Code to reconcile substantial differences in criminal law provisions among the nine State and Territorial jurisdictions. As part of this process, the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General has prepared a substantial (411 page) discussion paper 26 which deals primarily with large-scale drug cultivation and trafficking. The Committee is currently seeking submission concerning, among many other issues, the problem of how to define "traffickable quantities" of cannabis. In preparing to address this issue in a submission on the discussion paper, the Australian Drug Law Reform Foundation (ADLRF) sought input from knowledgeable individuals on the internet concerning this question. This request produced several responses, from which the following three have been selected for quotation: 27
Despite the apparent consensus among governmental commissions and policy analysts in favour of establishing limits on personal cultivation, potentially serious logistical and philosophical problems would complicate such a policy. Most obviously, how should whatever limits are selected be monitored and enforced? Without resorting to intrusive police tactics, it is likely that the only feasible approach to enforcement would be to foster an ethic in the cannabis-consuming community to the effect that the reformed system of cannabis control deserves loyalty and respect - recognising that the alternative is continued (or re-instated) prohibition. The system would presumably foster the "dobbing in" of cheaters by offended citizens, just as tax cheats might be. Whether such a system of self-enforcement would be effective is uncertain, at best. In addition, it is not difficult to conceive of problematic situations. For example, an individual who harvested a cannabis crop on behalf of himself and friends might well temporarily possess more than the stipulated limit until s/he distributed the crop amongst the friends. There is also the problem of determining how many plants under cultivation will in fact yield useable cannabis. Only the female plants are generally considered useable, and of these some will fail to mature for a variety of reasons. How many plants in total are needed to ensure five (or whatever number) mature female plants? There are no easy answers to such questions. A further problem with imposing limits on personal cultivation concerns a fundamental tenet of law involving sale of goods. Uniformly, the passage of goods and the passage of some return value must be proved: A provided 20 widgets to B and B paid A $20 in return. On the other hand, a cannabis law might say that because A has 6 cannabis plants, A intends to sell them for a profit. There is no need to identify or produce B, nor to prove the passage of the goods, payment for the goods, whether there was a profit from the sale, or even that there is an intention to sell. All of these factors are "proven" by the mere existence of (say) 6 plants. This seems problematic. At the least, additional evidence of intent to sell (for profit) would seem necessary before charges would be laid. On the other hand, there is surely some number of plants above which the intent to sell for profit can reasonably be inferred. It can be seen that the problem of specifying limits on personal cultivation is a significant one for systems of partial prohibition. Similar difficulties arise in the context of a regulated system where personal cultivation is also allowed. As noted above, a regulated system would treat cannabis much like alcohol or tobacco.
Growers would be licensed by a cannabis control board, which would also be responsible for
taxing, labeling, purity/potency checks, and administering the system. A distribution
system similar to cigarettes would carry cannabis into licensed outlets, such as pubs 28 The potential of a regulated approach to harness the financial power of cannabis commerce, i.e., through taxes, is an attractive feature. Informal estimates of the value of New Zealand’s cannabis crop exceed $1 billion NZD annually. Although this estimate is probably substantially inflated (especially taking into account the price drops that would result from removal of black market incentives), potential tax revenues would still likely be in the range of tens of millions of dollars per year (assuming a 10-20 percent tax rate). A tax rate would need to be selected that balanced the need to undercut the black market (by keeping taxes relatively low) against society's interest in discouraging excessive cannabis use (by keeping taxes relatively high).29 An example of a regulated system was contained in a recent bill, sponsored by State Leader of the Australian Democrats, Mr Mike Elliott, which was narrowly defeated 11 - 8 on a conscience vote by the Legislative Council in South Australia; "The cannabis would have been grown under licence, with strict government control. Advertising, pormotion and consumption in ppublic places and its sale to minors would have been banned and purchasers would have been given health information about the drug. "Mr Elliot said the bill was not about the legalisation of cannabis but its regulated availability. The proposed legislation was in line with recommendations made last July by the Legislative Council's Select Committee on the control and Illegal use of Drugs of Dependence." 30 Probably the greatest advantage of a regulated system is that only via regulation is the black market in cannabis likely to be severely reduced or eliminated. As is often noted, schools are rarely troubled by black marketeers attempting to sell alcohol or tobacco at (or near) schools. This is not to say that gangs and other forms of organised crime would simply disappear, of course, and indeed they would likely turn to other forms of criminal activities to replace the lost revenue in trafficking in cannabis. Nevertheless, young people would in all likelihood be substantially reduced. A further argument in favour of a regulated approach is that quality and potency can best be controlled through governmental regulation. 31 Moreover, regulation provides Government with substantial control over terms of sale and related activities. 32 Regarding drawbacks to a regulated approach, the 1995 AIC report cautioned that under a regulated system "greater visibility of the drug in retail outlets may act as an effective form of advertising, exposing more people (in particular, more young people) to the temptation to experiment." 33 However, if the sale of cannabis were restricted to adults-only venues (e.g., designated coffee shops) this problem would probably be manageable. Moreover, cannabis is already widely available in schools. It seems unlikely that the availability of cannabis to adults in adult-only venues would substantially increase young people’s propensity to experiment (which is more often due to peer pressure and a desire to demonstrate rebelliousness). What impact would a regulated approach have on rural (often Maori) communities? In the previous section it was argued that partial prohibition might reduce income to these communities by virtue of reducing the black market. A regulated system, in contrast, could benefit rural communities insofar as it would cut out much of the profits currently taken by urban distributors, who buy from the farmers in large quantities and sell in the towns and cities in small quantities. 34 A regulated approach might therefore return proportionally more income to the communities. However, if cannabis prices fell substantially below current black-market prices, total community income could remain stable or even drop. 35 There is therefore considerable uncertainty surrounding the question of what impact either partial prohibition or regulation would have on Maori and other rural communities. What is certain is that in a regulated environment these communities would be free of the stigma of criminality associated with a principal farming commodity, and would be able to compete in (what would become) a "white market". Also, the impact on Maori communities of moving away from a policy of total cannabis prohibition depends on much more than economics. In this regard, it is vital that input be obtained from Maori communities concerning the likely effects of various systems of cannabis control on Maori health and well-being. The major drawback to a regulated system is likely to be political. No other country has adopted a system in which cannabis is regulated and taxed like alcohol or tobacco; the Netherlands' approach comes closest. Partial prohibition, on the other hand, has been tried with success in other countries. Whether New Zealand’s propensity for social innovation and pragmatism could permit trialing a regulated system of cannabis control as part of a "social experiment" is perhaps unlikely in view its basic conservatism on drug issues. Personal Cultivation in a Regulated System If a reglulated system were adopted, should personal-scale cultivation also be permitted? Continued small-scale growing could be viewed as equivalent to"home brew" beer or small-scale wine making. Dale Gieringer has studied this question: Experience shows that it is no easy task to track down and regulate marijuana growers. More so than alcohol or tobacco, marijuana lends itself easily to small-scale home cultivation and production. The problem therefore arises as to how to treat home cultivation in the legal market. Clearly, the [for-profit] sale of untaxed home marijuana must be banned. In theory, home cultivation could also be taxed and licensed in order to maintain high prices. However, it seems unlikely that such requirements could be enforced in a world of legalized marijuana. The policing of home growers would appear to require many of the most odious and objectionable techniques of current marijuana enforcement, such as helicopter surveillance, snooping on homes and spying on garden stores. 36 From a practical perspective it is likely that the best approach would be to permit a certain level of personal level cultivation by adults. This raises the question of what limits might be placed on the number of plants one would be permitted to grow, as discussed above.
Section 3. International Treaty Considerations Two international treaties are relevant to the discussion of cannabis policy: the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 1 as amended in 1972, and the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention).2 As the name of the latter treaty suggests, the Vienna Convention is primarily concerned with international trafficking, whereas the Single Convention restricts the domestic cannabis policy of signatory nations. As such, the Single Convention (to which New Zealand is a signatory) is the primary potential obstacle to changes in domestic cannabis policy. Article 36 of the Single Convention requires signatory nations to make possession and use of cannabis, 3 "cannabis resin (hashish), and "extracts and tinctures of cannabis" (among other drugs) an offence:
Use and commerce in drugs covered under the Single Convention are to be restricted to "scientific and medical purposes". Although this particular clause seems rather black-and-white, the treaty as a whole provides considerable room for varying interpretations. As noted by a 1979 Canadian Department of Justice report
One major question to be addressed is whether the provisions of the Single Convention concerning cannabis possession are aimed at small-scale personal use or, alternatively, large-scale (even international) trafficking. No less an authority than Adolf Lande, who served as secretary of the UN Permanent Central Narcotics Board and the UN Drug Supervisory Body, and who was also one of the main drafters of the 1961 Convention, wrote that
Similarly, the official Commentary on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961, prepared by the Office of the UN Secretary General, states that whether personal use of drugs requires imposition of penal sanctions "is a question which may be answered differently in different countries." 7 The same commentary proceeds to note that those nations that do interpret Article 36 as requiring a legal approach to personal use
Further, as noted by Noll, a senior legal officer of the United Nations Division of Narcotic Drugs, the requirement that Parties limit the use of drugs to medical and scientific purposes does not require them to "attain that goal by providing penal sanctions for unauthorized ‘use’ or ‘personal consumption’ of drugs." 8 Noll also points out that the "whole international drug control system envisages in its penal provisions the illicit traffic in drugs; this also holds true for the 1972 Protocol." 9 (Emphasis in original.) An explanation for the apparent contradiction between these interpretations and the language found in Article 36 (s-para 1-A) is provided by Smith. 10 Governmental commissions on cannabis control have arrived at divergent opinions on the question of whether the Single Convention requires signatory nations to ban personal use of cannabis. The Williams Royal Commission 11 concluded in the affirmative, as did the Canadian LeDain Commission. 12 However, the 1978 Sackville Commission report concluded that
Similarly, the U.S. National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse took the view that "the word ‘possession’ in Article 36 refers not to possession for personal use but to possession as a link in illicit trafficking." 14 The Commission concluded that measures such as "an educational program and similar approaches designed to discourage use" could be employed to meet treaty obligations.15 The 1972 Protocol added a second subparagraph (s-para 1(b)) to Article 36, paragraph 1. This provision reads:
The official Commentary emphasises that these alternatives to punishment for the offences listed in Article 36 s-para 1A can be instituted "no matter how serious that offence may be." 16 This provision reinforces the more permissive interpretations of the treaties described above. The authors of 1994 AIC report appear to take the position that only free availability is ruled out by international treaties,17 permitting both a policy of partial prohibition and a regulated approach. The Victorian Premier’s Drug Advisory Council took the position that partial prohibition was permitted under the treaties, but recommend further study of the matter.
A few other provisions of the Single Convention have received attention in the cannabis policy debate, including paragraph 3 of Article 28, which states that "The Parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to prevent the misuse of, and illicit traffic in, the leaves of the cannabis plant." 20 Similarly, Article 22 of the Single Convention reads as follows:
A reasonable interpretation of these clauses is that if a country decides that a system other than prohibition is most appropriate for protecting public health and welfare and for deterring illicit trafficking, that country is not obligated by virtue of the Single Convention to maintain a prohibition policy. It is for this reason that the Oregon Cannabis Tax Act, a citizen referendum slated for a vote in 1998, makes frequent reference to the fact that the proposed new system of cannabis control (regulated, taxed, and sold through state-run liquor stores) is being put in place for the express purpose of "preventing the misuse of, and illicit traffic in" cannabis. In addition, the text of the Act amply details why prohibition increases both misuse and (almost by definition) illicit traffic. Along similar lines, Article 2(5) requires that:
As noted by the 1994 AIC report, "It must be emphasised, however, that Article 2(5) is not mandatory. Rather, special measures of control can be imposed if, in the opinion of the Party, they are ‘necessary’ or ‘appropriate’." Our reading of this complicated literature, and of the treaties themselves, leads us to conclude that a policy of partial prohibition, as defined above, would certainly be considered by most authorities as being in compliance with international treaties. On the other hand, a policy of regulated commerce would find less support among a majority of authorities. However, the authoritative interpretations of the Single Convention described above would appear to permit a system of regulation and control. In particular, if New Zealand were to notify the United Nations that, after careful study, it had determined that a regulated system of cannabis control were necessary to reduce both public harm and illicit trafficking, it seems unlikely that such an announcement would be condemned (except, perhaps, by the United States). To clarify matters, and as permitted by the Single Convention, New Zealand could propose an amendment to the treaty, 21 perhaps along the lines of "Notwithstanding any other provision, a regulated system of domestic cannabis control shall not be deemed impermissible, provided due care is taken to prevent international trafficking." As described earlier, only regulated commerce in cannabis is likely to substantially reduce or eliminate the black market. Moreover, rural (and perhaps particularly Maori communities) would likely be disadvantaged by partial prohibition. It seems inappropriate for countries to be forced by international treaty to foster black markets within their borders, especially if doing so serves to disadvantage native populations. Such concerns have been raised increasingly, including by the AIC:
Similarly, the Victorian Drugs Advisory Council discussed with concern the restrictions imposed by international treaty restrictions, particularly with respect to cannabis:
Analogous concerns could be raised in the New Zealand environment. International involvements should not dictate domestic policy.
Section 4 Key Issues in Cannabis Control In this Section we address certain key issues with respect to alternative systems of cannabis control, the ones being (1) specification of a plan for ascertaining the outcomes of a reformed cannabis policy, (2) development of appropriate drug education and of (3) treatment programmes for use within a reformed cannabis policy. These issues are of such substantial complexity that we defer detailed consideration of them here. To a large extent the Drug Policy Forum will depend on recommendations it receives from advisors and submissions in addressing these issues in its final report. Nevertheless, a few observations can be offered concerning each of these items It seems self-evident that any substantial revision in the system of cannabis control should be accompanied by an assessment of important outcomes. These include changes in the extent of use within society of cannabis and other drugs, including cocaine, heroin, tobacco and alcohol. As discussed in Appendix A, there is reason to believe that increased cannabis use could lead to decreased use of these other drugs. Additional outcome measures would include:
Data concerning these outcomes are likely to be relatively accessible and should be of generally high quality. The scope and methods required for a suitable assessment program are well within the capabilities of contemporary New Zealand researchers. Nevertheless, a considerable effort will be required to obtain these data and considerable care must be devoted to the always challenging process of deriving sound causal inferences. Such an effort should be carefully planned using the combined efforts and resources of several relevant research and governmental bodies. It is imperative that appropriate and effective education programmes be developed in conjunction with a reformed cannabis control system. As always, specialised programmes would be needed for different target audiences (e.g., adults, school children). The cornerstone of all programmes would be the provision of accurate information. School-based drug education programs based on harm exaggeration have been shown either to have no effect or to produce a "boomerang effect" by increasing drug use rates in children exposed to these programs compared to those not so exposed. 1 2 Effective education programmes would likely require acknowledgement of the fact that among other innate appetites, people from childhood on seek to alter their normal state of waking consciousness from time to time, and that like all appetites, this one is neither good nor bad, but can be indulged in more or less productive and more or less harmful ways. Drug use is, therefore, a fact of life - although accepting this particular fact and communicating it to children is difficult for many adults. Indeed, the situation is similar to the problems faced when communicating sexual information to children. Moving from a "just say no" or a "just be careful" approach to drug education will be seen by many as encouraging youthful drug use. However, a more realistic and honest approach to the whole issue of drug use deserves a try, and is probably essential within the context of a reformed cannabis policy. Such an approach would emphasise the importance of delaying psychoactive drug use until well along in the psychological maturation process, as well as the key tenets of safe and responsible drug use. Another key goal of drug education programmes would to facilitate the evolution of appropriate public attitudes regarding the responsible use of cannabis. The 1995 Australian Institute of Criminology report addressed this issue:
Thus, the importance of credible and (therefore) effective drug programs is difficult to overstate in the context of a reformed cannabis control system. Relatively little is known about the effectiveness of treatment programmes aimed at rehabilitating cannabis users with problems of dependence or harmful use. Certainly effectiveness will depend on voluntary presentation for treatment, as is the case also for alcohol and other drug treatment programmes. Also, treatment programs are likely to be both better attended and more effective outside a prohibition context, as the problematic behaviour is then no longer subject to criminal sanctions or to such substantial stigmatisation. The Forum will depend on advice and submissions from experts in this arena to arrive at additional recommendations concerning cannabis treatment programmes in our final report. Like all other provisions of a cannabis control policy, any restrictions placed on driving after the use of cannabis should be based on evidence. In reviewing the evidence on this topic, we find - somewhat surprisingly - that almost every major study performed in this area has shown that drivers who use cannabis only (i.e., no concomitant alcohol) perform as well or better than "straight" drivers. In the only study of drivers under actual driving conditions (conducted in Holland), the U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, concluded that:
This study represents the "gold standard" study of cannabis effects on driving. All other studies must be based on indirect evidence, including (and especially) determining whether victims of fatal traffic accidents had cannabis in their system. For example, another study by DOT/NHTSA, published in 1992, 6 examined blood samples taken from 1882 drivers killed in car, truck and motorcycle accidents in seven states during 1990-91. Importantly, this was one of the few studies to make a substantial effort to determine whether fatally injured drivers were responsible for the accident. (Studies that fail to do this are of questionable validity.) In this study, alcohol was found in 51.5% of the specimens. Just 17.8% showed traces of other drugs; marijuana was a distant second to alcohol at 6.7%, followed by cocaine (5.3%), benzodiazepine tranquilizers (2.9%) and amphetamine (1.9%). Two-thirds of marijuana- and other-drug-using drivers were also positive for alcohol. The report concluded that alcohol was by far the "dominant problem" in drug-related accidents. A responsibility analysis showed that alcohol-using drivers were conspicuously culpable in fatal accidents, especially at high blood concentrations or in combination with other drugs, including marijuana. However, those who used marijuana alone were found to be if anything less culpable than non-drug-users. The report concluded, "there was no indication that marijuana by itself was a cause of fatal accidents." Quoting from the report:
A similar conclusion was reached in Australia, as reported by the Alcohol and Other Drugs Council in its internet "news of the day" feature:
A study performed by the State of Washington 8 found that only about 6 percent of drivers killed in automobile crashes tested positive for marijuana and not also alcohol. This study was conducted for one year from September '92 through August '93. This study is open to varying interpretations depending on one’s estimate of the prevalence of cannabis-positivity in the driving population (and recalling that cannabis can be detected for days or weeks after last use). Based on available statistics, cannabis use among young males who are at highest risk of involvement in automobile crashes is on the order of 30-35 percent, 9 again indicating that cannabis-only drivers were under-represented in this group. In addition, it is highly unlikely that all of the cannabis-positive victims were "high" at the time of the crash. Finally, Mason and McBay assessed a series of 600 drivers killed in single-vehicle accidents. 10 These investigators estimated that at most one driver was significantly impaired by cannabis, compared to between 9 and 28 drivers impaired by alcohol and cannabis, and 476 drivers who had blood alcohol concentrations over 0.10 mg/100cc. The 1995 AIC report describes additional studies on cannabis and driving, most of which reached similar conclusions:
The strength and consistency of this body of evidence is surprising, to say the least. Indeed, on the basis of these studies one could conceivably recommend, as the AIC appears to do, that drivers consider using cannabis (only) as a means to reduce the accident rate! Although we certainly do not make such a recommendation, we must nonetheless take account of the evidence. One important conclusion emerging from this evidence, as noted in the 1992 DOT/NHTSA study, the combination of alcohol and cannabis appears to be particularly conducive to the production of fatal accidents. This effect was also observed in, among others, the studies by Gieringer, Williams et al., and Mason and McBay, cited above. Accordingly, one might consider a policy in which the consumption of any alcoholic beverages be prohibited if one also consumes cannabis prior to driving. Such a policy might be difficult to enforce, however, in the absence of a test for recent cannabis use. 15 More important and effective would be public education campaigns designed to foster an ethic of "no drinking if you’re toking and driving" (or some such motto). Driving after consuming cannabis alone would be legal, except insofar as impairment is produced. In this regard, we believe that laws should address impairment in driving ability per se, rather than chemical tests of body fluids. Such tests of functional impairment are commonly applied by police (although more so in countries other than New Zealand, apparently). Penalties for driving while impaired (regardless of the cause) are already substantial. 16 As such, probably no change is required in the law on this point. A range of additional issues will require clarification, some of which are listed below, including only sketchy suggestions about how they might be addressed. Should the policy cover hashish and cannabis oil? Experience in The Netherlands has shown that an open market in cannabis products resulted in minimal use of cannabis oil (which is messy and offers no real advantage over medium-high potency cannabis 17). People generally do not wish to "overdo" the cannabis experience.18 These considerations, together with problems of enforcement, lead us to recommend that the revised cannabis law include all forms of cannabis products. An educational campaign would aim to produce a culture that disapproved of the use of more potent forms.19 Like all others, this provision would be revisited after an assessment of the impact of the law change. Age limit? 18 for cultivation and use. Make consistent with alcohol laws. Where can be smoked? Private homes and adults-only premises where permitted by establishment, e.g. pubs, bars, designated coffee-shops. Penalties for unauthorised cultivation, possession, or sale? Sales to minors by adults would be heavily penalised, as would for-profit sale of cannabis outside the regulated system. More minor infringements, such as exceeding the five-plant limit by a plant or two would presumably be treated as a minor offence. Appendix A Public Health Impacts of Repeal of Cannabis Prohibition As noted in Section 2, one of the principal goals of a reformed cannabis policy is to promote public health. The impact of implementing an alternative policy will depend in substantial part on the extent to which (1) cannabis use is increased, (2) this increased use produces harms, and (3) increased use leads to decreases in the use of (and harms resulting from) alcohol and tobacco. Considering first the extent to which repeal of prohibition might lead to the increased use of cannabis throughout New Zealand society, it seems likely that at least some people who would not try cannabis while it was illegal would do so it were legal. Of these, some proportion will continue to use over a more or less lengthy period of time, and some further proportion of these users will develop psychological dependence. 1 Further, some people who already use cannabis will use more and for longer periods if legal sanctions on such use were reduced. So much seems commonsensical, yet evidence in support of these assumptions is hard to find. One of the most complete reviews of the relevant evidence was conducted by the Australian Institute of Criminology in its 1995 report on alternative systems of cannabis control.2
Thus, the international literature does not support the claim that repeal of cannabis prohibition will substantially increase cannabis use in New Zealand. What about the impact of cannabis law liberalisation on use by teenagers, in particular? The AIC discussed the possible impact of normalising adult cannabis use on encouraging use among young people:
On the other hand, what actual evidence exists is encouraging. As noted in Section 2 of the discussion paper, The Netherlands’ government has addressed this issue: 25
Further, according to Dr John Morgan and Professor Lynn Zimmer,
This latter observation also provides evidence against the claim that cannabis use in itself tends to promote the subsequent use of heroin or cocaine. Another reason why teenage use of cannabis is unlikely to increase substantially following repeal of total prohibition is that, unlike many adults, young people typically have ready access to cannabis at schools. Thus, it is likely that teenagers who wish to use are already using. Because any change in the cannabis law would pertain only adults (supplying cannabis to minors would remain an offence), it seems unlikely that teen use would increase under such a system. Moreover, removing the aura of total prohibition will reduce the glamourous appeal of cannabis to young people.27 This substantial body of evidence notwithstanding, let us assume that cannabis use were to rise substantially following repeal of prohibition. What health effects might follow? Health Effects The scientific literature on the health effects of cannabis is enormous, and cannot be reviewed here in any detail. Instead, we again cite from the 1995 Australian Institute of Criminology report, 28 which in turn refers to a report prepared by the National Centre for Drug and Alcohol Research (NDARC) at the University of New South Wales:
A recent report on cannabis prepared by the New Zealand Ministry of Health also relied heavily on the NDARC report in assessing health effects. The report concluded: Overall, the current public health risks of cannabis use are small to moderate in size, and are significantly less than the public health risks of tobacco and alcohol. However . . . if there were a significant increase in the number of long-term cannabis users . . . the assessment of the public health importance of cannabis use would increase. 30 Our reading of the literature on cannabis and health leads us to conclude that cannabis appears to be relatively harmless for about 90 percent of the people who use it (including young people, most of whom use only transiently). The remaining 10 percent of users will experience a variety of mostly (but not entirely) reversible problems with short-term memory, worsening of pre-existing psychological problems, compulsive use, or respiratory difficulties due to smoking.31 For the most part, those people who experience substantial problems of dependence and excessive use probably have difficulty with impulse control in general. It is widely accepted in the research community that the adverse health effects of cannabis, while real, are substantially less severe than those associated with excessive alcohol and tobacco.32 Two recent studies tend to confirm this view. In the first of these, conducted by the National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre at the University of New South Wales, investigators interviewed 268 cannabis smokers and 31 non-using partners and family members. The researchers concluded that the health of long-term marijuana users is virtually no different from that of the general population. 33 A much larger American study examining ten years of mortality data for over 65,000 men and women found no statistically significant association between marijuana smoking and death.34 The study's statistical methodology controlled for the use of tobacco and alcohol so that deaths from marijuana smoking could be clearly identified. The above research evidence notwithstanding, the Forum trustees understand that many people, and young people in particular, have been harmed by excessive or harmful cannabis use. We do not believe that cannabis is completely safe, of course - far from it. In the final analysis, however, the health effects of cannabis - however one might view them - are largely irrelevant to the problem of deciding which cannabis control policy to adopt. Indeed, the more harmful we judge cannabis to be, the more important it is to exercise control over its distribution. Such control cannot be exercised in a prohibition environment, which in effect abdicates control to the black market. Alcohol/Tobacco Substitution Effects Finally, the public health impact of increased cannabis use cannot be considered in isolation from the effect such an increase would have on the associated use rates of (and harm from) other drugs, particularly alcohol and tobacco. In fact, there is evidence that cannabis can serve as a substitute for both of these latter drugs. With respect to alcohol, a consistent finding in field research of cannabis use is the tendency of many cannabis users to decrease their alcohol intake when cannabis is available, and to increase alcohol use when cannabis is unavailable. This was a significant finding of Rev McFerran’s during his extensive field work in New Zealand during the early 1970’s. When the observer first entered into the marihuana social networks in the auckland area, he found that among those whom he initially contacted this was the case. There were actually users of marihuana who had ceased using alcohol at that time. One heard alcohol being described as an aggressive, sordid and unpleasant drug and used only to acquire an ego trip. However, as the study progressed it became apparent that the use of alcohol and marihuana are not necessarily exclusive although a marked change in attitude by marihuana users to alcohol developed. When enquiry was made regarding the informants' attitude to alcohol, none were strongly favourable to ists use, either before or after the commencement of marihuana use. Yet there was an extreme shift in attitude away from alcohol . . . The study shows that slightly less than half of those who were formerly favourable to alcohol use moved to an unfavourable attitude after using marihuana. Half of those who had been uncertain decided either for or against. More than four times as many informants became favourable and twice as many became strongly unfavourable in the attitude held about alcohol prior to using marihuana. -The comments of informants followed the theme that marihuana was preferable to alcohol. 35 Alcohol was still used by many cannabis users, but to a more restrained and controlled extent: There is a decided move away from alcohol use as the general or necessary social lubricant, but with most users it still has its place. Of the 160 informants 153 (96%) of them had used alcohol prior to marihuana . . . 36 Asked how they rated their personal use of alcohol, not one of the informants felt that they presently had a problem associated with alcohol . . . Alcohol for some marihuana users is the alternative drug when marihuana supplies become limited. 37 Similar observations were made in a more recent study of cannabis use in Maori communities in the far north. The report notes that many Maori use cannabis to decrease their alcohol intake, and that this substitution is considered desirable:
There is additional research evidence for a cannabis-alcohol substitution effect.40 41 For example, researcher Karyn Model examined the impact of substituting civil penalties for criminal sanctions for cannabis possession on hospital emergency room admissions for drug abuse in the mid-1970's. 42 As the substitution hypothesis would suggest, emergency room episodes related to drugs other than cannabis were 12 percent lower in the states that had decriminalized. Lowering the effective "price" of cannabis appeared to reduce the harmful use of other substances. The data did not permit the isolation of alcohol emergencies from those caused by the use of heroin, cocaine or prescription drugs. But based on previous research Model concluded that alcohol was far and away the most likely drug replaced by cannabis. This finding was reported in the New York Times:43
This latter finding is congruent with most of the studies cited in Section 4 concerning cannabis and driving. Finally, it has been reported anecdotally that cannabis can be used therapeutically to assist alcoholics in reducing or eliminating alcohol intake. |